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Abstract
This study considers simultaneously two important aspects of tax-
ation, environmental policy and redistribution. Tax policy is con-
strained by the asymmetric information of agentsproductivities and
preferences. Two-dimensional heterogeneity a¤ects the optimality of
commodity taxation: it can be used to redistributional or environ-
mental purposes, but there seems to be a trade-o¤ between these ob-
jectives. However, the contradiction between the two aspects is not as
clear as in the case with identical consumer preferences.
It is also shown that the Sandmo-Dixit result of the separability
of environmental taxes fails with two-dimensional heterogeneity in the
pooling optimum, but not in the separating optimum.The explanation
to this is that there are too few policy instruments in the pooling
equilibrium: commodity taxes should take care of both redistribution
and externality internalisation.
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1 Introduction
In the recent literature of optimal taxation and redistribution the assumption
of preference homogeneity is abandoned and households are allowed to have
di¤erent tastes. Heterogeneity can arise from di¤erent tastes for leisure, dif-
ferent tastes for consumption or from some combination of these. Most of the
literature concentrates on the former type of heterogeneity1. Introducing an
additional dimension to individualscharacteristics makes the analysis more
di¢ cult: there are now four groups of households. To make the calculations
more reasonable the number of household types is often reduced to three.
Three groups are adequate in most cases to characterise the essential e¤ects
of heterogeneous preferences.
To design the optimal tax scheme, the direction of redistribution needs
to be determined. It is no longer straightforward to determine which group
should be treated the most gently. Sandmo (1993) discusses the problem of
comparing utilities when tastes di¤er. He nds that even if utilities could
be compared, a change in the parameter set describing the economy (such
as prices) can reverse the order. Also the literature of social choice devotes
attention to this question2. The social welfare approach aims at taking indi-
vidualsdi¤erent preferences into account even when it means treating indi-
viduals with equal skill levels di¤erently. According to the horizontal equity
principle individuals should not be treated di¤erently on the ground of their
di¤erent preferences. However under asymmetric information this might be
a costly or even an impossible requirement.
In a model with heterogeneous and usually unobservable preferences a
possibility of screening is of special interest. Heterogeneous preferences have
rst been analysed in the framework considering the optimality of workfare
e.g. by Besley and Coate (1995), Beaudry and Blackorby (1997) and Cu¤
(2000). Tarkiainen and Tuomala (1999) study the optimal tax policy numer-
ically in an economy where households di¤er with respect to abilities and
work preferences. Boadway et al. (2002) nd that if there are some im-
1An exception is Blomquist and Christiansen (2004), where heterogeneity in preferences
for consumption goods is also discussed.
2See Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1999) for a survey on this subject.
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portant but unobservable characteristics a¤ecting individuals choices, it can
be optimal to abandon the income tax schedule based on equal weights on
preference groups, even if the resulting tax scheme might seem regressive in
terms of the observable characteristics, such as income.
With two-dimensional unobservable characteristics any action revealing
characteristics under asymmetric information is valuable. Introducing an ad-
ditional consumption good to the economy o¤ers a possibility to study the
role of indirect taxation. Saez (2002) nds that a tax on commodity is de-
sirable when individuals with high income have relatively higher preference
for the commodity or if the consumption of the commodity increases with
leisure. Also Jordahl and Micheletto (2002) got parallel results: in a model
with heterogeneous preferences the consumption of a good complementary to
leisure does not need to be discouraged by taxation, and a commodity that is
expected to be encouraged should not always be subsidized by a negative tax
rate. Blomquist and Christiansen (2004) suggest that commodity taxation
may get a new role as a device in di¤erentiating between di¤erent groups.
Contrary to the Atkinson-Stiglitz result of the redundancy of commodity
taxation, when individuals have di¤erent preferences for commodity bundles
imposing a tax on commodities might be desirable even when preferences are
separable.
In the light of the earlier studies an assumption of heterogeneous prefer-
ences seems to a¤ect the recommendations of the optimal tax policy. This
study aims at combining two elds of research, the recent extension of the
optimal tax models to heterogeneous preferences and a somewhat older dis-
cussion of the redistributional problems of environmental taxation3. A closer
analysis of a term dening the valuation of environmental externality reveals
that there are some terms induced by redistribution constraint that a¤ect
to opposite direction compared to environmental aims. Although the exis-
tence of such terms does not imply that environmental and redistributional
3An excellent survey of environmental policy as a part of the optimal taxation can
be found from Bovenberg and Goulder (2002). For a survey of problems in combining
environmental and redistributional aspects see e.g. Smith (1992), Harrison (1994) and
OECD (2001). More recent research on the possible regressivity of environmental taxes
can be found from Walls and Hanson (1999), Jacobsen, Birr-Pedersen and Wier (2003).
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aspects are contradictory, it can be interpreted as one possible explanation
to empirical ndings of regressivity of environmental taxes.
The model used here assumes mixed taxation, i.e. a non-linear income
tax and a linear commodity tax. The valuation for the environmental exter-
nality and the optimal commodity tax rule will be considered in two cases: in
the separating equilibrium where each household choose their own income-
consumption bundle and in the pooling optimum, where two of the house-
holds cannot be distinguished by their choice.
The paper is constructed as follows. In Chapter 2 we introduce the model.
Chapter 3 derives the optimisation problem and the rst order conditions.
The valuation of the externality is derived in Chapter 4, where also the trade-
o¤ between environmental and redistributional aspects is discussed. Chapter
5 concentrates on the commodity tax rules and Sandmo-Dixit principle. Fi-
nally, Chapter 6 concludes.
2 The model
The model here is very similar to the one used in Blomquist and Chris-
tiansen (2004) with the exception of harmful environmental externalities. It
is based on Mirrlees (1976) type of optimal income tax model with hetero-
geneous households, di¤ering with respect to productivities (as in Stiglitz,
1982; Stern, 1982) and preferences. A model with mixed taxation with one-
dimensional heterogeneity and environmental externalities is used e.g. in
Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997). Aronsson (2005) studies environmental policy
and taxation with an emphasis on employment aspect. Cremer,Gahvari and
Ladoux (1998) consider optimal taxation in a case of two dimensional het-
erogeneity and environmental externalities. However, they do not examine
the redistributional aspect or the possibility of di¤erent types of optima.
To avoid too restrictive assumptions of utilities, we assume that hetero-
geneity results from the di¤erent preferences for leisure. However, unless
preferences are completely separable, the amount of leisure is likely to af-
fect also householdsconsumption and their assessment of the environmental
quality. The relation depends on the complementarity of leisure and con-
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sumption and environmental quality. When leisure and environmental qual-
ity are complements, the household with stronger preference for leisure has
also stronger preference for the environment. Thus heterogeneity is reected
also to preferences for consumption and environment.
Here it is assumed to be three types of households as characterised in
Table 1 below.
productivity
low high
preference weak type 1 type 3
for leisure strong - type 2
Table 1: Characteristics of household groups
Households supply labour Lh and receive an exogenous wage rate wh,
which reects their productivities, i.e. w1 < w2 = w3. There is a constant
wage ratio 
 = w
1
w3
. Labour income Y h = whLh is taxed by the optimal non-
linear income tax scheme T (Y h). We also assume that the labour income of
type 1 households is the lowest and the gross income of type 3 is the highest.
Households use all their net income Bh = Y h   T (Y h) to consumption.
There are two goods in the markets4 denoted by a matrix X =
"
Xc
Xd
#
.
Xc is the cleangood, whereas Xd is the dirtygood creating a harmful
environmental externality. Both goods are assumed to be normal.
There is a linear commodity tax t =
"
tc
td
#
so that consumer prices can be
denoted by a vector q = t+p, where p =
"
pc
pd
#
stands for producer prices.
The demand Xhi
 
q; Bh; Lh; E

of household h (h = 1; 2; 3) for commodity i
(i = c; d) is a function of prices q, after-tax income Bh, labour supply Lh and
externality E, where E =
P
h
Xhd
 
q; Bh; Lh; E

.
Public sector has two preferences: more equal income distribution5 and
4We omit production side of the economy because it does not have any e¤ect on our
results.
5We implicitly assume that the current distribution of income is su¢ ciently unequal
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cleaner environment. It has two tax devices, non-linear income tax and
linear commodity tax, to nance a constant revenue requirement G. The
redistribution from the high productivity households to the low productiv-
ity households is constrained by self-selection constraints as productivities
are unobservable. Furthermore there is a problem in separating between the
households receiving low income due to low productivity and the high pro-
ductivity households earning less due to their strong preference for leisure.
If income is redistributed with means of income taxation from type 3 house-
holds to both type 1 and type 2 households, the horizontal equity principle
demanding an equal treatment for households with same characteristics is
violated. Thus income taxation has to be designed so, that all households
choose the combination of labour supply and net income meant for them
rather than mimic the choice of other household type.
In the separating optimum all households choose a di¤erent point. The
binding self-selection constraints are that rstly, type 3 household should
not mimic type 2 household, and secondly, type 2 household should not
mimic type 1 household. In mathematical form the constraints are given as
V 3 (q; B3; L3; E)  V 3 (q; B2; L2; E) and V 2 (q; B2; L2; E)  V 2 (q; B1;
L1; E) :
Not all self-selection constraints are necessary binding. In the pooling
optimum we assume that households of type 1 and 2 voluntarily choose
the same point and thus income taxation cannot be used to di¤erentiate
between these two groups. However, they do not necessarily choose ex-
actly the same consumption bundles, as they are assumed to have hetero-
geneous preferences. This raises a question of whether commodity taxes
could be used as a screening tool to the redistributional purposes. There
are again two self-selection constraints V 3 (q; B3; L3; E)  V 3 (q; B2; L2; E)
and V 3 (q; B3; L3; E)  V 3 (q; B1;
L1; E) but in the pooling case, as we
have B1 = B2, Y 1 = Y 2 and 
L1 = L2, they represent exactly the same
outcome. Naturally, when households 1 and 2 choose voluntarily the same
income consumption bundle they do not have any incentive to mimic each
other.
for redistribution to be desirable. However, the results derived here would be applicable
also to opposite case.
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3 The optimisation problem
Government is optimising the utility of the low productivity (type 1) house-
hold subject to two Pareto constraints
V 2
 
q; B1; L1; E
  V 2 and V 3  q; B3; L3; E  V 3 (1)
In the separating optimum there are two self-selection constraints, given
by
V 3
 
q; B3; L3; E
  V 3  q; B2; L2; E and V 2  q; B2; L2; E  V 2  q; B1;
L1; E
(2)
whereas in the pooling case one constraint V 3 (q; B3; L3; E) V 3 (q; B1;
L1; E)
is su¢ cient to capture the restriction mimicking has. Another restriction
comes from governments budget constraint requiring that the income from
taxes equals the revenue requirement. Using consumers budget constraint
this can be rewritten asX
h
Y h  
X
h
pTXh
 
q; Bh; Lh; E

= G (3)
And nally the fth constraint captures the e¤ect of the externalityX
h
Xhd
 
q; Bh; Lh; E

= E (4)
Because the Lagrange function and the rst order conditions are very
similar in two optimums, we present only the pooling case here, whereas the
optimisation conditions in the separating equilibrium appear in the appendix
A. The Lagrangean of the optimisation problem in pooling case is given by
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	 = V 1
 
q; B1; L1; E

+ 2

V 2
 
q; B1;
L1; E
  V 2+ 3 V 3  q; B3; L3; E  V 3
+ 

V 3
 
q; B3; L3; E
  V 3  q; B1;
L1; E
+ 
"X
h
whLh  
X
h
pTXh
 
q; Bh; Lh; E
  G#
+ 
"
E  
X
h
Xhd
 
q; Bh; Lh; E
#
(5)
The optimisation problem is to choose B1; B3; L1; L3 and t optimally.
The rst order conditions needed are
V 1L + 2V
2
L
  bV 3L
 + 
 X
h=1;2
wh  
X
h=1;2
pT
@Xh
@L1
!
  
X
h=1;2
@Xhd
@L1
= 0 (6)
V 1B + 2V
2
B   bV 3B    X
h=1;2
pT
@Xh
@B1
  
X
h=1;2
@Xhd
@B1
= 0 (7)
(3 + )V
3
L + 

w3   pT @X
3
@L3

  @X
3
d
@L3
= 0 (8)
(3 + )V
3
B   pT
@X3
@B3
  @X
3
d
@B3
= 0 (9)
V 1E + 2V
2
E + (3 + )V
3
E   bV 3E
  
X
h=1;2;3
pT
@Xh
@E
+ 
 
1 
X
h=1;2;3
@Xhd
@E
!
= 0 (10)
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V 1q + 2V
2
q + (3 + )V
3
q   bV 3q
  
X
h=1;2;3
pT
@Xh
@q
  
X
h=1;2;3
@Xhd
@q
= 0 (11)
where the hat terms refer to mimickers, i.e. true type 3 household mim-
icking type 1 household.
4 The harmfulness of the externality
The valuation of the externality is an useful term for two reasons. First, a
closer look at the terms in it enables a simultaneous consideration of environ-
mental and redistributional aspects. Second, the optimal tax rules depend
on the environmental quality via term dening the valuation of the exter-
nality. The valuation of the environmental externality tells how much harm
externality produces and it is measured here by the shadow price. Here the
form 

is used, i.e. the shadow price is given relative to the governments
tax revenues.
We notice that by taking a derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to
B2, we get an useful term
h
2V 2B

  pT @X2
@B2
  

@X2d
@B2
i
= 1

@	
@B2
=
	B2

. This
term indicates the value given to the hypothetical increase in the net income
of type 2 households. A similar term was utilised in Blomquist and Chris-
tiansen (2004). It can be interpreted to be negative if the desired direction
of redistribution is from the high ability households towards the low ability
households. The implicit form6 the shadow price can be solved from the
6Written in this form	B2 contains the shadow price

 . In explicit form the harmfulness
of the externality is given by

 = 

8><>:
P
h
MWPhEB +
h
2V
2
B
   pT @X
2
@B1
i 
MWP 2EB  MWP 1EB

 
h
MW^P 3EB  MWP 1EB
i
 P
h
tT @x
h
@E
9>=>;
where  1
1 P
h
@xh
d
@E +
@X2
d
@B2
[MWP 2EB MWP 1EB]
and  = 
bV 3B
 :
9
equation (10)


= 
264
P
h
MWP hEB +
	B2

[MWP 2EB  MWP 1EB]
 
h
MW^P 3EB  MWP 1EB
i
 P
h
tT @x
h
@E
375 (12)
where  V hE
V hB
=MWP hEB is the marginal willingness to pay to avoid the exter-
nality,  = 1
1 P
h
@xh
d
@E
is the environmental feedback parameter and  = 
bV 3B

.
The exact sign of the shadow price cannot be determined from the form
we have. However, as long as the externality is harmful, the shadow price can
be assumed to positive. Environmental feedback parameter  is known to be
positive (Sandmo, 1980). Also the rst term in brackets is positive implying
the direct harm of the externality. The last term referring to governments
tax revenues from commodity taxes depends on how externality a¤ects the
demand for goods. The rst and the last term are similar to the ones in
earlier literature (see Pirttilä and Tuomala, 1997; and Tenhunen, 2004), so
we concentrate here on the two terms in the middle.
MWP hEB depends on how much household has leisure: it increases with
leisure, when environmental quality and leisure are complements7. From the
two terms in the middle with di¤erences in MWP hEB, now only dMWP 3EB  
MWP 1EB refers to mimicking. When mimicking, high productivity house-
holds (type 3) have more leisure than true type 1 households with lower pro-
ductivity. When the environmental harm is decreased by lowering the level
of the externality, mimicking becomes more attractive. To prevent that, the
income tax of type 3 households has to be lowered and redistribution comes
more unequal. Thus environmental and redistributional terms lead to oppo-
site directions implying a trade-o¤ between the two government preferences
Here coe¢ cient  is positive; it only has an additional positive term in the denominator
compared to ordinary environmental feedback parameter . The conclusions of the terms
are identical, as 	B2 < 0 implies that also coe¢ cient
2V
2
B
   pT @X
2
@B1 is negative.
7Many of the conclusions in this paper are based on the assumption of environmental
quality and leisure being complements. The analysis in the case of substitutes would go
through analogously. As the former case seems more plausible to us, to avoid confusion we
are concentrating on the case where harmfulness of the externality increases with leisure.
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in this case. The same result was found earlier e.g. in Pirttilä and Tuomala
(1997).
The second term in brackets, the di¤erence in the marginal willingnesses
to pay, MWP 2EB   MWP 1EB is positive, as both households 1 and 2 are
choosing the same income level but type 2 household has higher productivity
and thus more leisure. This term does not refer to mimicking nor to redis-
tribution, because in pooling optimum these two household types cannot be
di¤erentiated and thus no redistribution can be made by income taxation.
The term rather refers to the di¤erence in the preferences for environmental
quality. The fact that households are not equal a¤ects the harmfulness of
the shadow price. With negative 	B2 the di¤erence between MWP 2EB and
MWP 1EB decreases the harmful e¤ect of the externality. Thus this term af-
fects to the same direction as the previous term referring to redistribution. If
an increase in the level of the externality widens the di¤erence between the
marginal willingnesses to pay, a part of the harm from the externality is com-
pensated by gains from redistribution. This trade-o¤ between environmental
quality and redistribution indicates that a higher level of the environmen-
tal externality can be used as a tool to deter mimicking and to redistribute
income between otherwise indistinguishable households.
In the separating optimum the shadow price is given by8


= 
264
P
h
MWP hEB   2
h dMWP 2EB  MWP 1EBi
 3
h dMWP 3EB  MWP 2EBi P
h
tT @x
h
@E
375 ; (13)
where MWP hEB =  V
h
E
V hB
is the marginal willingness to pay to avoid the
externality,  = 1
1 P
h
@xh
d
@E
is the environmental feedback parameter and h =
bV hB

,h = 2; 3.
The environmental feedback parameter  and the sum of MWP hEB are
also positive as before, and tax revenue term depends on how externality af-
fects the demand. The two terms in the middle are again the interesting ones,
because here the di¤erence in the marginal willingnesses to pay ( MWP hEB)
8For derivation, see Appendix B.
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refers to redistribution question.
Type 2 household with higher productivity mimicking type 1 household
gets more leisure, as they can do the work of type 1 faster and thus we havedMWP 2EB > MWP 1EB. Thus the e¤ect of the second term in the brackets in
Equation (13) is negative when environmental quality is a complement with
leisure. This means, that decreasing the level of the externality increases
type 2 households incentive to mimic. To deter that, the government needs
to redene income tax scheme by lowering type 2 households taxes and
increasing type 1 householdstaxes, i.e. let the income di¤erences between
type 1 and 2 households rise.
The third term refers to di¤erence dMWP 3EB   MWP 2EB. Households
2 and 3 have same productivities and thus here the same conclusion as in
previous case does not hold. The di¤erence can be solved by thinking about
the deviation in preferences. When environmental quality, i.e. the negative of
the environmental externality, is complement with leisure, type 3 households
prefer leisure less and hence they do not careof the environmental quality
as much as type 2 with higher preference for leisure. This means that type
3 households are willing to pay less to avoid the externality than type 2
households, i.e. dMWP 3EB < MWP 2EB and the e¤ect of the third term in
Equation (13) is positive. Thus more equal income distribution between type
2 and 3 households decreases the e¤ect of this term by making mimicking
less attractive and lowers the valuation of the harmfulness of the externality.
As a result, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 1 When environmental quality and leisure are complements,
the valuation of the harmfulness of the externality is decreased when income
di¤erences between households 2 and 3 decrease and income di¤erences be-
tween type 1 and 2 households increase.
The result implies that if the harmfulness of the externality increases with
leisure, redistribution from high productivity households towards low ability
households worsens environmental quality whereas redistribution from more
working high productivity household towards less working high productivity
household improves environmental situation. Now the contradiction between
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environmental and redistributional aspects found in the earlier literature is
not so clear anymore, because of the e¤ect of term dMWP 3EB  MWP 2EB. It
is possible, that the e¤ect of the latter mimicking term is su¢ ciently large to
compensate the negative e¤ect of the rst mimicking term so that the overall
relation between the two aspects is positive. In that case environmental and
redistributional aspects would be in accordance from governments point of
view.
One possible interpretation for strong preference for leisure could be lazi-
ness and persons with a low preference for leisure as "hard working", as
in Cu¤ (2000). The value of the harmfulness of the externality would be
decreased most when redistribution is directed from hard working low pro-
ductivity households and from hard working high productivity households to
lazy high productivity households. This direction of redistribution may not
be the most supported one by the majority.
It is also worth noticing that, both in the separating and pooling equilib-
rium, when the preferences are separable between leisure and environmental
quality, the di¤erences in MWP hEB,  and the tax revenue term all are zero.
In the case of separable preferences terms with the di¤erences in MWP hEB
will remain in the shadow price only when households have heterogeneous
preferences directly for environmental quality.
5 Commodity taxation
In the presence of an externality commodity taxes aim at internalising the
harmful e¤ect. Sandmos additivity property (Sandmo, 1975) and Dixits
principle of targeting (1985), referred here as the Sandmo-Dixit principle,
states that the externality internalising part of the commodity tax should be
separable from the other part of the tax rate and it should a¤ect only the
tax rate of that good, which creates the externality. There has been some
discussion about the generality of Sandmo-Dixit principle (Kopczuk, 2003;
Tenhunen 2004). Here we study how an additional dimension in heterogeneity
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a¤ects the principle.
In our framework the internalisation of the externality is not the only ob-
jective of taxation. Commodity taxation might get a new role as a screening
tool in a framework with heterogeneous preferences. Blomquist and Chris-
tiansen (2004) get a result that in an economy with one consumption good
and no externalities commodity taxation has an e¤ect on the redistribution
and thus it can be used to mitigate self-selection constraint.
The optimal commodity tax rates9 are given by
t =
	B2

S+
 
X2  X1  bV 3B

S+
bX3  X1+ 

"
0
1
#
: (14)
where, S+ is an unique pseudoinverse10 of
P
h
ShT .
This form corresponds the one received in Blomquist and Christiansen
(2004) with the exception of the last term referring to externality. The
second term implies that if mimicker consumes more goods, i.e. if leisure and
consumption are complements, bX3 > X1 and commodity tax can be used to
deter mimicking. Increasing commodity taxes and decreasing income taxes
of type 1 households leaves mimicker worse o¤ and thus makes mimicking
less attractive. If the di¤erence in consumption is other way around, i.e.bX3 < X1, a negative commodity tax has the same e¤ect.
The rst term in Equation (14) is interesting for two reasons. First it
implies that if there is a di¤erence in consumption between households of
type 1 and 2, commodity taxation may also be used for redistribution. If
type 2 households consume more, an increase in the commodity tax makes
them worse o¤. In the opposite case a subsidy on commodities can be used.
In the pooling equilibrium type 1 and 2 households were not observable, but
now commodity taxes treat households di¤erently.
The other important feature in the redistribution term is in the coe¢ cient
9For derivation see appendix.
10Actually Slutsky substitution matrix S probably also has the ordinary inverse S 1,
as it is negative semidenite Slutsky matrix. However, a pseudoinverse exists also for
singular and non-square matrices and it is equal to ordinary inverse in the case of non-
singular square matrix. To ensure the existence of the inverse, we use here pseudoinverse
S+.
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	B2

. It includes the shadow price of the externality 

. This means, that
when types 1 and 2 have unidentical demand for goods, the externality e¤ect
appears in the tax rates of both commodities, also in the tax rate of the clean
good. Before we can be sure of the failure of the Sandmo-Dixit principle, it
is worth noting that when the shadow price 

from (12) is substituted in
(14), there is a possibility that the coe¢ cient for 	B2

cancels out to zero.
The condition for this to happen is
 
X2T  X1T +   MWP 2EB  MWP 1EBX
h
shd = 0 : (15)
Without more precise functional forms for the model we cannot rule out
the possibility of this term being zero. If in some special case the condition
holds, the rst terms in the right hand side of Equations (32) and (14) cancel
out and the shadow price reduces to


= 
(X
h
MWP hEB    
h
MW^P 3EB  MWP 1EB
i
 
X
h
tT
@xh
@E
)
(16)
However, in general case there is no need for the condition (15) to hold.
Thus we can assume that generally term 	B2

remains in the redistribution
term and the Sandmo-Dixit principle fails in this two dimensional case in the
pooling optimum. The following proposition summarises the result.
Proposition 2 The e¤ect of the externality on commodity taxes can no
longer be separated to a¤ect only the good that creates the externality. Thus
Sandmo-Dixit principle fails in the pooling optimum unless the consumption
of the clean good is equal for pooling households.
In the separating optimum the optimal commodity tax rule11 corresponds
the ones received in earlier literature (Blomquist and Christiansen, 2004).
Sandmo-Dixit principle continues to hold and the ability to use commodity
taxes to redistributional aims depends on the consumption behaviour of the
mimickers. Under some assumptions (commodities are complements with
11For details see Appendix C.
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leisure and substitutes with each other and S is non-singular) increasing the
tax on commodities mitigates one self-selection constraint and tightens the
other. Thus using commodity taxes to mitigate the self-selection constraints
includes a trade-o¤: one of the constraints can be relaxed at the expense of
the other and the e¤ect of commodity taxation on mimicking terms is thus
ambiguous.
The result of the generality of the Sandmo-Dixit principle is somewhat
surprising. Our analysis suggests that assuming a three-type economy is
not su¢ cient to make the principle fail, but in the pooling equilibrium the
externality based part cannot anymore be separated from the rest of the tax
rate. In the separating case 	B2 is actually a rst order condition which
requires that marginal valuations for each groupshypothetical increase in
income are zero, whereas in pooling case this term is not (necessarily) zero.
When the government wishes to redistribute away from type 2 i.e. 	B2 <
0, in the pooling case the commodity taxation is the only tax instrument
that separates type 2 households, as long as household groups in pooling
choose unidentical consumption bundles. As the valuation of the hypothetical
income depends on the externality created by an increased consumption of
dirty good, also the optimal commodity tax of the clean good is a¤ected by
the externality.
The reason for the failure of the Sandmo-Dixit principle in the pooling
case is the insu¢ cient number of policy instruments. In the separating case
income taxation takes care of the redistributional aims and commodity tax-
ation internalises the externality. However, in the pooling case income taxes
are not su¢ cient to handle redistribution, and the commodity tax has two
policy objectives: redistribution and externality.
6 Conclusions
This study analyses the e¤ect of a harmful environmental externality in an
economy with two-dimensional heterogeneity. There are assumed to be three
types of households that di¤er both with respect to their productivities and
their preferences for leisure. The valuation of the externality and the optimal
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commodity tax rates are discussed in two cases: in the pooling optimum,
where the low productivity household and the high productivity household
with a strong preference for leisure are assumed to choose the same income-
consumption bundle and in the separating optimum where each household
chooses a di¤erent point.
The harmfulness of the externality measured by its shadow price is of the
same form as in an economy with only one-dimensional heterogeneity. The
term referring to mimicking suggests that there might be problems in combin-
ing environmental and redistributional preferences. The other term sourcing
from the di¤erence in preference for environmental quality may a¤ect in ei-
ther direction depending on the sign of its coe¢ cient. However, with some
assumptions of the desired direction of redistribution also this term indicates
a contradiction between environmental and redistributional preferences. In
the separating optimum one of the self-selection terms has negative e¤ect
implying problems in combining environmental and redistributional aspects,
as in earlier literature. The other self-selection term has a positive e¤ect.
The valuation of the externality is decreased when income di¤erences be-
tween high productivity households decreases and di¤erences between high
and low productivity households increases. Thus the contradiction observed
in earlier case is not so clear anymore.
The optimal commodity taxes in the pooling equilibrium o¤er two impor-
tant results. First is that commodity tax can be used as a tool to di¤erentiate
and redistribute income between the households behaving identically if these
two household have unequal consumption of goods. If the household from
which we want to distribute consumes more (less), a positive (negative) com-
modity tax makes them worse o¤ and mitigates the self-selection constraint.
Another interesting question is the e¤ect of the externality in commod-
ity taxes. In the pooling optimum Sandmo-Dixit principle fails to hold, i.e.
externality based part of the commodity tax cannot be anymore separated
from the other part of the tax and it a¤ects also the tax rate of the good not
creating the harm. In the separating optimum we can generalize Sandmo-
Dixit principle. The explanation to this is that whereas in the separating
optimum optimisation is done with respect to all types, in the pooling opti-
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mum two household types are indistinguishable and the optimum is achieved
with respect to two groups of households only. There are too few policy in-
struments in the pooling equilibrium: commodity taxes should take care of
both redistribution and externality internalisation.
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Appendices
A Optimisation problem in the separating case
As a result of the similarity, the optimisation problem and the rst order
conditions of the separating optimum are presented only here. The Lagrange
function of the optimisation problem is given by
L = V 1
 
q; B1; L1; E

+ 2
h
V 2
 
q; B2; L2; E
  V 2i+ 3 hV 3  q; B3; L3; E  V 3i
+ 2

V 2
 
q; B2; L2; E
  V 2  q; B1;
L1; E
+ 3

V 3
 
q; B3; L3; E
  V 3  q; B2; L2; E
+ 
"X
h
whLh  
X
h
pTXh
 
q; Bh; Lh; E
  G#
+ 
"
E  
X
h
Xhd
 
q; Bh; Lh; E
#
(17)
The corresponding rst order conditions with respect to Lh, Bh for h =
1; 3, E and q are12
V 1L   2bV 2L
 +  w1   pT @X1@L1

  @X
1
d
@L1
= 0 (18)
V 1B   2bV 2B   pT @X1@B1   @X1d@B1 = 0 (19)
12Note that Xh is a function of Lh and Bh only, thus sums can be dropped out in the
rst six derivatives.
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(2 + 2)V
2
L   3bV 3L +  w2   pT @X2@L2

   @X
@L2
= 0 (20)
(2 + 2)V
2
B   3bV 3B   pT @X2@B2   @X2d@B2 = 0 (21)
(3 + 3)V
3
L + 

w3   pT @X
3
@L3

  @X
3
d
@L3
= 0 (22)
(3 + 3)V
3
B   pT
@X3
@B3
  @X
3
d
@B3
= 0 (23)
V 1E + (2 + 2)V
2
E + (3 + 3)V
3
E   2bV 2E   3bV 3E
  
X
h
pT
@Xh
@E
+ 
 
1 
X
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@Xhd
@E
!
= 0 (24)
V 1q + (2 + 2)V
2
q + (3 + 3)V
3
q   2bV 2q   3bV 3q
  
X
h
pT
@Xh
@q
  
X
h
@Xhd
@q
= 0 ; (25)
where again the hat terms refer to mimickers.
B The valuation of externality
B.1 The pooling case
To derive the shadow price rst add and subtract terms V^ 3B
V 1E
V 1B
and 2V 2B
V 1E
V 1B
from Equation (10). Denoting  V hE
V hB
= MWP hEB and using Slutsky type
properties
P
h
pT @X
h
@E
=
P
h
pT @x
h
@E
 P
h
MWP hEBp
T @Xh
@Bh
and
P
h
pT @x
h
@E
=MWP hEB 
tT @x
h
@E
subsequently we get
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Because B1 = B2, it must be that@X
2
@B1
= @X
2
@B2
. Thus we get

2V
2
B

  pT @X
2
@B1
  

@X2d
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 
MWP 1EB  MWP 2EB

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 
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h
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X
h
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@xh
@E
#
+


 
1 
X
h=1;2;3
@xhd
@E
!
= 0 (27)
With help of term 	B2 we get an implicit solution for the shadow price
presented in Equation (12).
B.2 The separating case
Letting  V hE
V hB
=MWP hEB denote the marginal willingness to pay to avoid the
externality and using the rst order conditions in Equations (19), (21) and
(23) we can write Equation (24) after some manipulations as
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(28)
Using similar Slutsky properties as in the pooling optimum and substi-
tuting these into Equation (28) and subtracting equivalent terms we get (13).
C The commodity tax rules
C.1 Derivation in the pooling case
Using Slutsky decomposition @X
h
@q
= Sh   @Xh
@Bh
XhT and Roys identity the
rst order condition in Equation (11) can be written as
  V 1BX1T   2V 2BX2T   (3 + )V 3BX3T + bV 3B bX3T
  
X
h=1;2;3
pT

Sh   @X
h
@Bh
XhT

  
X
h=1;2;3

shd  
@Xhd
@B
XhT

= 0 (29)
Multiplying Equation (7) by X1T and Equation (9) by X3T we can sub-
stitute some terms. Furthermore we use derivative 	B2 = 2V 2B   pT @X
2
@B2
 

@X2d
@B2
. With the help of the rst order conditions and 	B2 Equation (29) can
be given as
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Remembering that in the pooling equilibrium B1 = B2 and thus also
@Xh
@B1
= @X
h
@B2
we can simplify previous equation to the form

 2V 2B + 
@X2d
@B2
+ pT
@X2
@B2
  
X2T  X1T 
+ bV 3B bX3T  X1T   X
h=1;2;3
pTSh   
X
h=1;2;3
shd = 0 (31)
With the help of a di¤erential from consumers budget constraint it can
be noted that
P
h
qTSh = 0. Note also that
P
h
shd =
h
0 1
iP
h
Sh: Making
use of the denition of 	B2, reorganising terms and dividing them by  gives
us
X
h=1;2;3
tTSh =
	B2

 
X2T  X1T   bV 3B

bX3T  X1T+ 

X
h=1;2;3
shd (32)
Multiplying this from left by S+, an unique pseudoinverse (Moore-Penrose
inverse) of
P
h
ShT , gives us optimal commodity tax rates in (14).
C.2 Commodity taxes in the separating optimum
The optimal commodity tax rate can be derived in the same way as in the
pooling case. Using Roys identity and Slutsky decomposition Equation (25)
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can be written as
  V 1BX1T   (2 + 2)V 2BX2T
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Substituting in Equation (19) multiplied by X1T , Equation (21) multi-
plied by X2T and Equation (23) multiplied by X3T and reorganizing gives
us
X
h
tTSh =
X
h
qTSh   2
bX2  X1T   3 bX3  X2T +  h 0 1 iSh :
(34)
Taking a transpose, multiplying from left by S+, an unique pseudoinverse
(Moore-Penrose inverse) of
P
h
ShT , gives us
t =  2S+
bX2  X1  3S+ bX3  X2+ 
"
0
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#
: (35)
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